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Cyber-security Issues in Electric Transportation

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Increased cyber-security and privacy risks come from an increased attack surface made possible by extended physical exposure

- Software-governed coupling with electric grid
- Risk to
 - electric transportation infrastructure
 - electric grid
 - vehicles themselves

Other cyber-systems have significant exposure (e.g., WiFi, credit-card sales) but these aren't so exposed physically, nor do they threaten life-dependent infrastructure

View some risks through lens of use cases

Consider charging: Different modes, different ways to charge and pay

- At home
- Pass through occasionally at public station, e.g., Telsa
- At rest public location (street, parking garage, office parking lot)
- Cyber-security/privacy issues with paying for public charging
 - Several infrastructures, vendors involved
 - Increased burden on utilities of protecting location information
 - Consider the impact HIPAA has had on sharing medical information
 - Privacy laws r.e., geolocation, exist and vary by state.
 - E.g., General Data Protection Regulation requires consent for use
 - Increased opportunity for fraud
 - E.g., "charge-to-vehicle" with spoofed electronically accessed vehicle identifier

Johnson J, Berg T, Anderson B, Wright B. **Review of Electric Vehicle Charger Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities, Potential Impacts, and Defenses**. *Energies*. 2022; 15(11):3931.

EV-EVSE (Electric Vehicle Supply 1. Cloud-to-Cloud Other Cloud Services EVSE Vendor and/or Communications WAN Equipment) connectors **EVSE Operator Cloud** Navigation - Billing (Web/API) - 3rd Party Apps Charge vehicles Etc. Aggregator 3 Create load (Web/API) Wired or Cellular Wireless **EVSE** Owner Charge session authentication Internet Access 2. Internet Access Link EV operator (or vehicle) to EVSE Maintenance Authentication Power system 4 Terminals (serial, Terminal communications Ethernet, USB, JTAG) Charger 3. EVSE to Internet (e.g., OpenADR, MT Master OCSP) Controller 2 Link to cloud-based applications for EV Owner Internal **Grid Operators** monitoring, billing, control, ..., everything Internal or Operator Communication Control Board Network Couplers Maintenance Terminals 4. Internal Power 1 Control Board Electronics Distribution **Fransmission** System Reported vulnerabilities to follow have System Power been observed....

Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment

Figure 1. Electric vehicle communication ecosystem with EVSE components and external entities.

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There are a variety of devices and protocols in use

Connection control exposed by physical devices used in coupling

• Communication protocols not typically protected

EV -> EVSE could convey

- falsified charging parameters
- Malware

Widespread coordinated EV infection

• System-side load manipulation

Compromised EVSE -> EV

• Overcome EV protections, damage EV



Authentication

Authentication through RFID, NFA, credit card, terminal input

Plug-and-play authentication through cable itself

- Requires crypto-based authentication both sides, risks due to vulnerabilities of these
 - Intentional and unintentional

User interface a significant attack vector

- Complex interfaces typically admit vulnerabilities, exploits may lead to
 - Deny access to selected customers
 - Bypass authentication altogether
 - Disable charging altogether
 - Change prices



Web-servers are used in EV charging infrastructure, and in cloud-based EV charging system applications

- Observed vulnerabilities in specific services
- Compromise may lead to
 - Manipulation of infrastructure from
 Internet
 - Attacker control of large collection of EVSE devices, capability to impact
 - Power grid
 - Transportation
 - Other critical infrastructures



Modern EVSEs constructed with multiple circuit boards

- Communication using a variety of unsecured protocols
- Often connected through a switch, ensemble is accessible by connecting to a switch
- Connection points often left open in production systems
- Adversaries may monitor or disrupt operations



Use Case : Electric Highway

Variety of technologies being researched (based on rails, coils)

All depend exposed communication of some kind

Problems like 'stationary' EV charging infrastructure, with addition of

> Cyber-based systems for sensing, control, any billing, vehicle authentication



Image courtesy of Highways England

- Electrification increases societal dependence on complex cyber systems
- Electrification itself depends on other (vulnerable) systems which are dependent on cyber (e.g., authentication, billing)
- Electrification requires wide-spread physically unprotected exposure of infrastructure that is closely coupled to power grid
- Electrification infrastructure reduces impediments to potential wide-spread coordination interference through compromised vehicles and/or compromised EV charging infrastrastructure
- Electrification generates considerable personal data that legal frameworks may classify as requiring "protection"
- Policy may call for cyber-protected electrification, but responsibility and liability will be driven by incidents, and the courts